Why SECURECRYPT Cannot Assist Investigations

Modern investigations increasingly rely on forcing companies to hand over user data. Governments pressure service providers. Carriers are compelled to log metadata. Even cloud platforms quietly archive content for compliance.

SECURECRYPT cannot participate in that ecosystem, not because we refuse, but because the way our system is engineered makes cooperation technically impossible.

This is a direct consequence of how our end to end encryption, device hardening, and server architecture work. When a request arrives, there is nothing we can provide. There are no logs, no metadata, no message archives, no keys, and no unencrypted backups.

This is not a policy choice. It is a cryptographic fact.

End to End Encryption That Eliminates Access By Design

Every message, call, camera transmission, file, vault entry, and voice packet inside SECURECRYPT is encrypted at the device level before it ever leaves the phone.

We use modern, high assurance cryptographic primitives including X25519 for key exchange, AES GCM for encryption, and HKDF SHA256 and SHA512 for key derivation.

Each message uses a unique ephemeral key, providing forward secrecy. Even if a single key were compromised, it would reveal nothing about past or future messages.

Because only the sender and receiver hold the keys, SECURECRYPT has no technical ability to decrypt content. Messages never pass through our infrastructure in readable form, and decryption never occurs on a server. This is why no user conversations appear in backups, archives, logs, or compliance systems. Even if compelled, there is nothing to turn over.

Servers That Store Nothing and Reveal Nothing

SECURECRYPT uses encrypted relay servers that operate only as pass through nodes. They do not store messages, session data, or metadata. After delivery, ciphertext is deleted instantly from temporary memory.

No logs are kept. No archives exist. Relay servers cannot reveal user identities, message content, location, or contact lists because they are designed without the ability to observe them.

Multiple layers of reverse proxies hide core infrastructure so that even if one relay is seized, it only exposes the next hop, never the true servers. Autonomous system scans cannot map where the infrastructure originates, and no single node contains a complete picture of the network  .

This is why cooperation with authorities is impossible. The architecture denies visibility by default.

Device Level Protections That Block Forensic Extraction

Authorities often rely on mobile forensic tools like Cellebrite, GrayKey, Magnet, and Oxygen. SECURECRYPT neutralizes these vectors at the device layer.

The app will not open if a cable is connected.

The app will not open if Developer Mode is detected.

Five to seven failed PIN attempts trigger an automatic wipe.

Attempts to intercept wipe commands or tampering cause the app to shut down permanently.

Remote wipe destroys the device level keys instantly.

Cellebrite and GrayKey require physical cable access, a device in a responsive state, and the ability to run exploits through USB. SECURECRYPT denies that pathway. Even a powered device with the app installed exposes no readable content because encryption keys never leave secure memory.

No Cloud Sync, No iCloud, No Google, No Key Escrow

Consumer apps store everything on Apple or Google servers. SECURECRYPT does not use either ecosystem. There is no cloud sync. No key escrow. No server side history.

Your contacts and vault can be backed up only if you explicitly enable encrypted backups, and even then, message content is never included for your protection.

This ensures no subpoena, warrant, or government order can compel access through Big Tech platforms.

Why Authorities Cannot Compel Cooperation

Authorities can only obtain data if:

1. The company stores it

2. The company can decrypt it

3. The company controls the keys

4. A cloud provider stores collateral information

5. Device forensic tools can extract the content

With SECURECRYPT, none of these conditions exist.

We do not store data.

We do not hold keys.

We do not archive backups.

We do not retain metadata.

We do not cooperate with Google or Apple.

We block forensic tools at the hardware interaction layer.

The only party who can access decrypted content is the user. This is the foundation of our system and the reason SECURECRYPT cannot cooperate with authorities: the architecture makes compliance technically impossible.

Built for Environments Where Exposure Is Not an Option

SECURECRYPT is engineered for high risk users, journalists, executives, privacy professionals, and organizations operating in hostile or sensitive environments.

Every design choice reflects a single philosophy: privacy is a right, not a permission.

When authorities request access, all we can provide is a statement of fact:

We have nothing to give.